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Something new under the Rising Sun: 
expanding Australia–Japan defence cooperation
by Hayley Channer, Andrew Davies and Peter Jennings
A number of recent policy documents signal the Australian Government’s 
intent to deepen defence engagement in the Asia–Pacific, and future defence 
policy statements are likely to reinforce that objective. The Australia in the 
Asian century White Paper clearly established Asia as our primary economic 
and strategic focus. Australia’s first National Security Strategy gave as the first 
of its three priorities ‘strengthening regional engagement to support security’, 
and the 2013 Defence White Paper—released in May 2013—sets out an 
ambitious plan to strengthen defence relations with Japan.
There are several factors working to make the strategic environment more 
uncertain for Australia and other countries in the Asia–Pacific. First, and more 
quickly than was expected, there’s been the emergence of a sharper-toned 
China–US strategic competition. Military-to-military relations, in particular, are 
difficult. Second, there’s a curious blending of elements of cooperation and 
competition in Asia–Pacific affairs. The region’s tied together by economic and 
trade relations, but in important respects there’s an absence of trust between 
countries, particularly on military matters. Third, a number of middle-sized 
powers are emerging with stronger voices on security matters, particularly 
Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, India and even Australia. Fourth, 
there’s been a broad increase in the capabilities of many regional military 
forces and with it the growing risk of military incidents, particularly in the 
maritime domain. Taken together, these developments point to an increasingly 
complex region where competitive multipolarity is the defining characteristic of 
international engagement.
Even with an ensured American presence, because Australia’s resources are 
limited we can’t hope to achieve all of our strategic objectives in the region 
without engaging other players and finding innovative ways to develop a 
cooperative approach to building security. As the most capable of American 
partners in the region, Japan offers much as a closer partner to Australia. The 
bilateral relationship’s already strong—Japan’s now one of our closest Asian 
security partners.
Domestic factors
Recent developments in Japanese politics and defence policy have created 
an environment that encourages closer engagement. Japan’s conservative 
Abe government has made the nation’s defence forces a priority, with plans 
to increase defence spending by over A$1 billion (the first real increase to 
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the defence budget in a decade). Prime Minister Abe favours a revision of Japan’s 
postwar Constitution that would see the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) 
rebranded as the ‘National Defense Military’. Repositioning the role of the JSDF to 
officially recognise its full capacity as a defence force is currently prohibited under 
Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, which bans Japan from maintaining armed forces 
with ‘war potential’. Furthermore, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
between the US and Japan restricts Japan’s defence contacts outside of its alliance 
with the US. If the Abe government succeeds in this initiative, this transformation 
might lead to expanded defence engagement with other countries, including 
Australia. In particular, Japan and Australia could increase their defence industry 
cooperation and ease export controls (a move that Japan has recently taken with 
the United Kingdom).
While perhaps not as dramatic as the changes looming in Japan, there are 
aspects of the Australian political landscape that could have an impact on our 
defence relations. They include recent substantial cuts to the defence budget, the 
completion of a new Defence White Paper, and a potential change of government at 
the September 2013 federal election.
In May 2012, the Australian Government announced that it would cut the Defence 
budget over the next four years by $5.45 billion. The 2013 budget partially offset 
these cuts with an increase of expenditure over the next three years of around 
$3 billion but almost all of this was to cover the acquisition costs of an additional 
12 Super Hornet aircraft equipped with the Growler electronic warfare system. In 
other respects the ‘savings and efficiencies’ of earlier years will continue to have a 
potentially negative impact on defence engagement. While the government insists 
that the cuts won’t affect Australia’s current overseas operations, they mean that 
future overseas operations could become more limited in number and scope, 
and there’ll clearly also be pressures on exercising and other forms of regional 
engagement—including with Japan. Except at the margins Defence did not use 
the 2013 White Paper to review equipment acquisition priorities because the 
government’s position is that all core capabilities will be delivered, notwithstanding 
the spending cuts on force structure matters the 2013 White Paper looks very 
similar to the 2009 paper. However the statement contains a stronger focus on 
Australia’s defence posture—that is, what we do now with the military assets we 
actually have, rather than planning for the capabilities we don’t currently have.
Finally, there’s the federal election. Should a change of government take place later 
this year, Australia’s foreign policy towards Japan is unlikely to change. It’s largely 
bipartisan and, even though the Coalition has pledged to write a new Defence 
White paper 18 months after taking office, there are unlikely to be major changes 
to Australia’s defence position on Australia–Japan security relationship. We can 
expect a Coalition government to be as enthusiastic as the current one about 
developing it further.
Some of Australia’s domestic developments are concerning and some positive 
for the future of Australia–Japan defence relations. The question’s how to work 
through our changing domestic political situation and partner with Japan in the most 
productive and mutually beneficial way.
This paper analyses the benefits that could follow from expanded Australia–Japan 
defence engagement and outlines specific areas for enhanced engagement. 
While there are good reasons for like-minded allies of the US to cooperate on 
security issues, the degree to which we do so will be a matter for judgement by 
governments on both sides—Australia and Japan both have local, regional and 
global interests, and they aren’t all equally weighted. But enhanced Australia–Japan 
defence cooperation could lead to the development of capabilities that would allow 
the two countries to play a bigger role in contributing to the security of the region to 
the benefit of all.
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Current defence relations
Australia–Japan defence engagement has grown in recent years, largely due to 
similarities in strategic outlook that make us natural security partners. We both have 
the US as our main strategic ally under the ‘hub and spokes’ model, we’re both 
thriving democracies and we both have advanced economies and sophisticated 
military forces. We’re both members of the OECD and we share similar objectives 
for regional security. Importantly, we’re both stakeholders in a stable, rules-based 
international order and, as such, have a considerable stake in how the US responds 
to growing Chinese power and influence in the region and in the future of US–China 
relations generally.
This year’s seen further positive developments in the Australia–Japan defence 
relationship. In January, the Australia–Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
Agreement came into force, allowing logistics support between Australian and 
Japanese forces operating together. The agreement will further enhance our 
defence relations, providing a necessary framework for mutual logistical support 
during humanitarian, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. Discussions have 
also been held between our two defence departments on the potential for science 
and technology cooperation. These achievements build on the substantial progress 
that was made in 2011 and 2012.
In March 2011, Australia’s disaster assistance to Japan during a triple crisis built 
trust between the two nations and significantly bolstered defence ties. In the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the earthquake and the tsunami, for 
the first time in the history of Australia–Japan defence relations there were three 
Australian C-17 aircraft in Japan transporting JSDF personnel and equipment to 
and from the disaster zones.
2012 was a particularly big year. The Agreement on the Security of Information, 
signed in May, provides a framework for the protection of national security 
information shared between the Australian and Japanese governments. The 
agreement’s only the fourth of its kind (Japan’s signed similar ones with the US, 
NATO and France). To some extent, it’s a benchmark reflecting the significance of 
the Australia–Japan defence relationship.
In September 2012, a successful fourth ‘two-plus-two’ ministerial meeting resulted 
in an agreement between the Australian and Japanese defence and foreign 
ministers to expand joint military exercises. This meeting has paved the way 
for more practical military engagement between Australia and Japan and will 
ultimately enhance our interoperability and increase the skills and abilities of both 
defence organisations. In light of the opportunities presented through Japan’s 2011 
Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, our defence ministers 
also agreed to discuss a framework under which technology cooperation could 
be enhanced. Also to our mutual benefit will be the deepening and broadening of 
our information exchanges and the more personal connections that are allowed to 
develop within our military, policy and scientific communities.
In addition, in 2012 Australia lent support to Japan’s peacekeeping mission to South 
Sudan, deploying two Australian Defence Force personnel to be embedded with 
the Japanese contingent. This is significant because it’s the closest contact the 
Japanese and Australian defence forces have had since their mission in Al Muthana 
province in Iraq in the mid-2000s.
These bilateral arrangements and activities have added important new layers to the 
Australia–Japan defence relationship and reflect a positive trajectory for the future 
of the relationship.
Trilateral engagement with the US on security matters remains an important 
prospect for Australia and Japan. In June 2012, the senior civilian defence officials 
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of the three countries participated in the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on the 
sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Our Defence Ministers gave an 
undertaking to refine and consolidate our trilateral defence engagement over the 
next decade and to implement an action plan to meet common security challenges. 
The dialogue, which was established in 2006, provides an important opportunity 
for our Defence Ministers to discuss common regional threats, share their strategic 
perceptions and more closely align their strategies. As well as working on our 
trilateral defence engagement, there’s also the prospect of closer cooperation in 
cybersecurity and space.
The 2013 White Paper adds further ballast to the relationship, setting out a detailed 
statement of planned cooperation:
The defence relationship will support the ability of Australia and Japan to work 
together to contribute to international responses in the areas of humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping. In the region, Australia and Japan 
work to enhance the capacity of regional defence and security forces to improve their 
internal management and respond to challenges, including conducting humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief.
Japan has a strong history of technology and manufacturing expertise; the 
Government will continue to develop a defence science and technology relationship 
with Japan to identify cooperative areas of mutual benefit. Opportunities to enhance 
defence science and technology cooperation will be explored in both the research 
and operational testing fields, as will opportunities for industry cooperation.
The bilateral exercise program continues to grow in both scope and sophistication 
and the Government will continue to deepen exercises with all three Services with 
a focus on naval and air force cooperation. The Government will also pursue closer 
trilateral cooperation involving the United States through the Trilateral Strategic 
Dialogue.
Reasons to increase defence engagement with Japan
For the last half of the 20th century, Australia and Japan enjoyed—for the most 
part—a long period of relative strategic stability. Since the end of the Cold War, 
however, the security situation’s become more complex. The challenges posed by 
shifting power dynamics in the Asia–Pacific, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and non-traditional and emerging threats such as cybercrime 
have steadily increased.
Of those factors, the rise of China and the shift in power relativities in the 
Western Pacific are probably the biggest challenge, even though they present 
no immediate military threats. A strategic competition is intensifying between 
the US and China and, while it’s been carefully managed up to now, there are 
signs that it could become more complex and potentially dangerous. The US has 
made it clear publicly that it would like both Australia and Japan to do more in the 
sphere of military security, so it’s sensible to think about our options for closer 
strategic engagement.
North Korea and Iran are continuing to develop nuclear and missile capabilities 
that can directly threaten their immediate regions and, should they continue 
to export WMD material and technology, their actions could have wider 
negative repercussions.
In response to these developments, and the more general spread of high-level 
defence capabilities through military modernisation around the globe, the US is 
developing new strategies for operating in an environment where an adversary 
is attempting to deny access. The Joint Operational Access Concept and its 
subordinate AirSea Battle concept (discussed in detail below) put a premium on 
allies providing support in the form of bases, military contributions, or both. This 
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could have significant implications for Australia and Japan, which will be called upon 
to provide more capability in a broader security teaming arrangement.
Working against that are the rising cost and complexity of military systems. 
High-end capabilities are increasingly expensive and difficult to develop, and the 
worldwide trend is towards defence industry mergers and like-minded countries 
looking for areas where they can share the research and development burden. 
There’s room here for Australia and Japan to cooperate, to share technologies and 
to realise greater economies of scale.
There are many areas of non-traditional security where cooperation would allow 
more efficient uses of each country’s resources. For example, multinational groups 
can pose a threat from almost anywhere. In the maritime domain, the world’s 
major trade routes carry import and export traffic from essentially all countries. 
While Australia and Japan are geographically separated, they share common 
infrastructure in cyberspace, especially with the convergence of communications 
and computer systems. There’s room for cooperation in this regard.
And populations settled in areas prone to natural disasters are growing, producing 
a greater demand for humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The potential 
impact of climate change in the future will further exacerbate this trend.
It’s true that Australia, Japan and other countries already have cooperative 
programs in place or under development. They include multilateral efforts, to 
which Australia and Japan have contributed warships, to combat naval piracy; 
military exercises to build confidence and experience across regional militaries; 
and humanitarian and disaster relief operations in which many countries have 
participated. As well, there are developing relationships in the area of cybersecurity 
and network defence. These are all positive developments, and we’re likely to 
see more of this sort of activity. However, these developments are in some ways 
second-order security matters—with the exception of cybersecurity—and are less 
challenging than first-order security relationships involving the top-end military 
capabilities and the more difficult issues thrown up by the geopolitics of the Asia–
Pacific region and beyond.
But it doesn’t necessarily follow that Australia and Japan should be looking for 
deep cooperation on all security issues. There’ll be instances where our interests 
don’t coincide to any great degree. In every case, the two governments will 
balance the costs and benefits (immediate or potential) and make decisions based 
on judgements about how their national interests are best served. For example, 
Japan has much less stake in the stability of Solomon Islands or Timor-Leste than 
does Australia. Similarly, the extent to which Australia wants to become indirectly 
engaged in North Asian security remains a lively topic for national discussion.
The degree of cooperation between Australia and Japan will be decided by future 
governments in both countries, and they’ll weigh many factors when doing so. One 
of the most important will surely be the expectations that the US has about each of 
our contributions to the wider security framework that it’s trying to put in place.
Opportunities to expand Australia–Japan defence cooperation
In increasing degree of complexity, areas for collaborative work fall under three 
main categories of sensitivity to the constitutionally constrained Japanese system:
•	 Low-sensitivity activities could be cooperation in areas where there’s already a 
history of cooperation. This would include working together on humanitarian and 
disaster relief capabilities, second-order security activities (such as anti-piracy 
patrols and counterterrorism) and collaboration on cyber defence.
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•	 Medium-sensitivity cooperation would include collaborating on military exercises 
and on the development of military capabilities. Examples could be exchanges 
on submarine technology and ballistic missile defence.
•	 High-sensitivity cooperation would be collaboration on foreign intelligence 
collection, the development of a shared response to the US ‘AirSea Battle’ 
model and collaboration on sensitive asymmetric warfare capabilities (such as 
cyberwarfare and electronic attack).
The low-sensitivity activities are easy to justify and pursue; the medium-sensitivity 
issues are workable, and more can be done in those areas; the high-sensitivity 
activities require more discussion, but the US rebalance in the Asia–Pacific will 
force Japan and Australia to think about them—Washington has expectations of 
both countries’ contributions to the wider security framework that it’s trying to build.
In pursuing the medium- and high-sensitivity options, the challenge for Australia 
and Japan will be to weigh the costs and benefits and decide which avenues for 
expanded defence engagement are worth the risk. The following sections explore 
three areas of medium to high sensitivity: cooperation on submarine technology, the 
AirSea Battle concept and network operations.
Submarines: an area for Australia–Japan cooperation?
Australia and Japan both have sophisticated naval capabilities and both employ 
American-sourced systems, such as the P-3 Orion, the Aegis combat system and 
Seahawk helicopters. Both navies exercise with the US Navy (USN) and have a 
high degree of interoperability with it. There’s not much we have to do to be able 
to work with the Americans at sea. However, there’s one current opportunity for 
collaboration between Japan, Australia and the US that would further the cause of 
interoperability—Australia’s future submarine project, which has been the subject of 
much domestic discussion.
The Australian Government is gathering information in order to decide on the 
best way to proceed. While all options involve diesel–electric systems, the stated 
requirement is for a long-range submarine with high endurance and a substantial 
payload. Additionally, interoperability with the USN and the desire to have the best 
capabilities possible mean that the American combat system and weapons in the 
current Collins class are likely to be retained. The Collins subs have many of the 
desired properties but they’ve suffered from reliability problems, especially in their 
propulsion systems.
The government’s decided that the way ahead will be one of two possible routes: 
an evolution of the Collins class, retaining the combat system and weapons but with 
a substantially new propulsion system, or a new design submarine that draws on 
conventional submarine design skills in Australia and elsewhere and incorporates 
American combat and weapon systems.
Japan builds very successful large conventional submarines that are suited to 
operations in the Pacific region and are likely to be of great interest to Australia. 
It remains to be seen what can be achieved but, as a minimum, Australia would 
be very interested in Japanese propulsion technology as an option for either of 
the approaches described above. The Australian Government has committed to 
developing a submarine propulsion testbed facility, and it would work to Australia’s 
great advantage if one of the systems tested had significant Japanese input.
AirSea Battle and America’s allies
One of the major policy challenges for Australia and Japan is how to respond, both 
individually and together, to the US ‘pivot’ and the accompanying development of 
strategic and military concepts. The most important such concept is AirSea Battle1, 
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which has become the most visible sign of efforts by the US military to readjust 
its doctrine to deal with the growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenge. 
The concept is, in large part, a response to China’s development of greater A2/AD 
capabilities in an attempt to deny the US access to its near seas.
Put simply, AirSea Battle attempts to align all of the tools in America’s arsenal to 
coordinate against the increasingly complex threats of the 21st century. In practical 
terms and to date, it’s been developed to help the US and its allies continue to 
operate in contested territory.2
So far, the debate in the US on AirSea Battle has paid relatively little attention to 
America’s Asian allies’ views of the concept or roles in it. However, as a report by 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments noted, ‘AirSea Battle is not a 
US-only concept. Allies such as Japan and Australia, and possibly others, must play 
important enabling roles in a stable military balance.’ This raises some important 
strategic considerations for our defence planning, and it potentially complicates 
the delicate balance between the US as security ally and China as major trading 
partner for both Australia and Japan.
While there’s relatively little about AirSea Battle in the public domain, US thinking 
definitely includes a layered approach to defeating A2/AD challenges. There are 
several aspects of that approach that will potentially impinge on Australia’s and 
Japan’s force structures and doctrine development. Alternatively, either or both 
countries might be forced to decide what they aren’t prepared to do to support the 
US in A2/AD conflict.
The most significant AirSea Battle components in this respect are:
•	 the hardening of bases in North Asia and the Pacific (especially in South Korea, 
Japan and Guam)
•	 a ‘defence in depth’ approach of dispersing US forces across a wider area
•	 tactics and technologies to disrupt Chinese command, control, and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
•	 deep strike capabilities against distant targets
•	 distant blockade operations against shipping traffic to and from China.
The first two are relatively easy to implement and can be done on a bilateral basis 
with the US. Agreements on the hardening of bases or the hosting of US forces 
are basically matters for the US and its allies and partners to discuss between 
themselves. For example, Singapore’s agreed to host four USN warships, and 
Australia will host 2,500 US Marines and additional port visits by American vessels.
The last three are serious undertakings and would require a great deal of 
commitment by America’s allies if they were to participate. However, Japan and 
Australia should at least think through the capabilities that we’d need to do so—
even if we subsequently decide that they’re steps too far. And the way the issues 
will need to be discussed won’t be the same for our countries, although they’re 
likely to be controversial in both.
Australia has long been involved in expeditionary military operations—including 
many wars—in support of our major-power allies, so to some extent participation 
in AirSea Battle would be consistent with previous Australian policy. But, as noted 
above, we’re currently debating where on the spectrum of cooperation with the US 
we want to sit, and to what extent we want to avoid confrontation with China—in 
short, how we balance our security and economic interests.
Japan faces the same issue, as well as unresolved territorial disputes, but 
any participation in AirSea Battle is likely to be further complicated by Article 9 
considerations. For example, it would be a very big step for Japan to consider the 
development of deep strike capabilities.
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Nonetheless, there are things that Australia and Japan could do that are short of full 
participation but would allow a tiered engagement. Our level of engagement could 
be adjusted in either direction in the future should circumstances require it, while at 
the same time supporting and enabling the American concept.
Two broad areas for cooperation are the development of naval forces that are 
interoperable with the USN and cooperation on the development of capabilities for 
computer network operations. Neither would commit Australia or Japan to AirSea 
Battle, but both are likely to be welcomed by the US for adding depth to its own 
capabilities and both would give Australia and Japan the option of participation in 
American activities at various levels of commitment.
Network operations
A second high-sensitivity question about expanded cooperation is whether Australia 
and Japan can contribute to a wider allied effort on computer network operations. 
Those operations can be broken into three types:
•	 computer network defence tries to keep our own data and networks secure and 
develop an understanding of the nature of the threats against them in order to 
deploy successful countermeasures
•	 computer espionage involves the use of network exploitation techniques to 
gather information
•	 offensive cyber-operations involve cyberweapons, network infiltration and 
disruption, the insertion of false data and the corruption of stored information.
Computer network defence is a perfectly reasonable response to hostile activity 
such as espionage or sabotage aimed at exploiting our critical systems, so 
cooperation between Australia and Japan in that activity is easily acceptable. 
Given that many of the threats to Australian and Japanese (and other countries’) 
systems originate from the same sources, Australia and Japan would be justified 
in cooperating on cyber defence. While some cooperation in this area is already 
happening, successful cyber defence needs to be ‘joined up’ to avoid weaknesses 
in one sector being exploited to gain access to others.
While cooperation on computer network defence is relatively easy, jointly 
addressing computer espionage is more difficult. Computer espionage is an 
increasingly important part of intelligence operations for virtually every country. 
Australia and Japan—and each of us with the US—already have certain 
intelligence-sharing and coordination arrangements in place. It stands to reason 
that at least some of the data collected via network exploitation would also be 
shared. But operational procedures need to be designed to take account of 
legal and political considerations. There’s no in-principle reason that precludes 
cooperative activities, but working across jurisdictions requires the alignment 
of those activities with two sets of domestic law and with international law. This 
means that Australia and Japan would need to tread carefully if they increase their 
cooperation in this area.
Offensive cyber-operations are more problematic still—all of the same legal 
difficulties apply but there’s yet another layer of organisational complexity. 
Australia’s opted to set up its Cyber-Security Operations Centre under the auspices 
of its signals intelligence organisation within the Department of Defence, but not 
within the Australian Defence Force. The US has opted to set up a Cyber Command 
subordinate to its armed forces Strategic Command, with components sitting within 
army, navy and air force command structures. Given the compartmented nature 
of this kind of work, establishing links between organisations in different countries 
would require close liaison to establish who the appropriate counterparts are. This 
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combination of operational sensitivities and organisational mismatches would 
make it difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to develop a seamless approach to 
network operations. There’s good reason for Australia and Japan to takes steps in 
that direction.
Where to from here?
The Asia–Pacific security landscape is changing in ways that make it more 
complex (and in some ways more dangerous) as strategic competition between the 
established and emerging major powers deepens. The American response to this 
challenge is in many ways still a work in progress. As two of America’s close allies 
in the region, Australia and Japan need to think hard about the expectations that the 
US might have of us. We need to decide how we can work together to support our 
ally—and we need to decide what we’re prepared to do in support of its strategy.
Australia and Japan currently enjoy a very close defence relationship, partly 
because of our shared strategic values and the similarities between our security 
alliances and objectives. In this way, Australia–Japan defence relations are 
crucial to making long-term peace more likely in a changing strategic and 
security environment.
All indications are that Australia–Japan defence relations will improve and expand 
in the coming decades, not only because there’s a desire for closer ties and a 
substantially shared strategic view of the world, but also because there’ll be a 
growing need for us to work together to achieve common security goals.
There are a few hurdles to overcome to get there, not least of which is the 
availability of resources. Australia’s domestic political changes have had a 
transformative effect on Australian defence policy. Not all of these changes have 
been successfully handled in the 2013 Defence White Paper, but the document 
does articulate a sensible strategic approach to the bilateral relationship with Japan. 
Resource constraints might place limits on the full extent of what we can achieve in 
deeper defence relations with Japan, but not in the short to medium term.
The Asian century will bring with it new challenges, many of which will require a 
collective response. Working in concert, Australia and Japan are well positioned 
to make a positive contribution to the region, but that will require greater effort and 
more foresight from both sides. Our relationship needs to expand because the 
region will increasingly look to influential countries, like us, to take leading roles in 
maintaining regional stability.
Notes
1 Anti-access (A2) techniques are intended to deny a foreign military access to an area 
or prevent it from moving freely through the global commons. A2 challenges could 
include political and economic exclusion in the first instance and could then expand to 
include military aspects such as blanket denial of basing, staging and transit. At their 
most hostile, A2 instruments could include employing all of the offensive weapons of a 
nation’s arsenal. Area-denial (AD) challenges are intended to prevent an opposing force 
from entering and operating in an uncertain or contested territory. AD obstacles can be 
present in air, sea, land, space and cyberspace, and are intended to complicate and 
disrupt an opponent’s attempts to gain a presence in these areas.
2 For much more on AirSea Battle and its implications for America’s Asia–Pacific allies, see 
Benjamin Schreer, Planning the unthinkable war: ‘AirSea Battle’ and its implications for 
Australia, ASPI, April 2013. 
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